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THE ROLES OF STANDARDIZATION, CERTIFICATION
AND ASSURANCE SERVICES IN GLOBAL COMMERCE
Margaret Blair, Cynthia Williams & Li-Wen Lin*

I. INTRODUCTION
Two major problems that permeate complex modern production and
distribution enterprises are coordination and enforcement. While
mechanisms of coordination have been studied extensively in management
science and organizational economics, issues raised by the second set of
problems have been the focus of microeconomic theory, organizational
economics, and law, especially property, contract and business entity law
(e.g., North 1990). At least two major mechanisms of enforcement of
business and commercial understandings and agreements - legal contracts,
and the organization of activities within firms - have been studied at
considerable length by scholars in the law and economics tradition (e.g.,
Coase 1937; Williamson 1975). More recently, a third cluster of
mechanisms, including norms and reputation, have become an object of
study by economists and legal scholars (Richman 2004; Bernstein 1996;
Bernstein 1992; Bernstein 2001; Grief 1989).
Both organization within firms and organization by contract rely
heavily on rule of law.
*

Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, Professor of Law at the
University of Illinois College of Law, and JSD candidate at the University of Illinois
College of Law, respectively. The authors have had the benefit of substantial research
assistance from Everett Peaden, Bixuan Wu, Rebecca Conley, Brandon Martin, Yun
Chen, Joshua Rosenblatt, Tracy Dry Kane, Lily Huang and Emily Kamm. We appreciate
the comments of participants in the IEA meeting in Trento, Italy on Corporate Social
Responsibility and Corporate Governance in July, 2006; participants at faculty workshops
at the University of Georgia Law School, the University of North Carolina Law School
and Vanderbilt University Law School, participants in Prof. Stephen Bainbridge’s student
workshop at UCLA Law School; and the participants in the University of Illinois and
Sun Yat-Sen University School of Law, Guangzhou, China, conference on the Role of
Law in Economic Development in March of 2007. Particular thanks are owed to Ed
Rock, Oliver Williamson, Mike Vandenberg, David Zaring, and John Conley for their
careful attention to earlier drafts.

2

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 03

Hence one might expect that they would be unavailable or ineffective for
businesses operating in a global environment, especially in countries that
do not have established rule of law and well-developed independent courts
and legal systems.
It might seem that the explosion in global
communications capabilities in the last decade would counteract or offset
that problem by making it easier for the third mechanism – norms and
reputation - to serve as an effective way to enforce contracts and
expectations in the absence of law. But while reputational enforcement
mechanisms can be quite powerful in getting large, highly visible
organizations to live up to contract requirements and social norms, the
same communications capabilities that can make reputation important can
also be used to publish misleading information, distort perceptions, freeride on reputations of others, conceal norm violations, and generally
introduce at least as much noise as useful information into the process of
determining whether legitimate expectations have been met on all sides,
and economic gains have been divided up accordingly.
In this article we discuss the role of a fourth enforcement
mechanism that we claim is rapidly becoming extremely important in
global business and trade. This is the use of third-party, non-governmental
standard-setting, inspection, assurance and certification services. Not only
has there been an explosion in recent years in demand for third-party
assurance services, as we describe below, but also a proliferation of
quantifiable standards and metrics by which such services can measure
and report on performance by parties to actual and potential contracts.
Many of these performance metrics define standards for acceptable social
and environmental behavior, as well as for such things as quality control
and on-time delivery, so that third-party assurance services also appear to
exercise a regulatory function, importing and enforcing norms of
acceptable conduct throughout lengthening supply chains.
Probably the most familiar and well-established type of third-party
standard-setting and assurance service is the body of accounting rules as
applied by external auditors, who examine financial statements and the
processes by which they were generated, and opine on whether the
statements were produced in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and fairly present the underlying economic reality of
the firm. There is evidence that “boards of state accountants” were used to
verify state revenues and expenditures in ancient Athens, circa 500-300
B.C., for example (Costouros 1978). Financial institutions that invest in or
insure business ventures have also long made use of other kinds of non-
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financial measures and assurance services. As maritime commerce
expanded centuries ago, for example, marine insurance companies in
France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy hired inspectors to make sure
that ships being used for international commerce were sea-worthy.
Indeed, several of the global assurance organizations that today certify
adherence to a wide range of product specifications, or to the effectiveness
of specific quality or management systems within firms, initially began as
maritime inspectors.1
Our thesis in this paper is that a number of factors are coming
together in the global business environment to cause the demand for
management standards and third-party assurance services to explode. In
fact, we speculate that the role played by standardization and third-party
assurance is rapidly becoming so important that, in some parts of the
world where rule of law is weak, business norms unreliable, and regulation
of business practices erratic or non-existent, private sector players may be
turning to third-party assurance services as the dominant mechanism for
regulating business and enforcing contracts. We offer reasons for this
development, evidence of its scope and scale, and then describe the
phenomenon in more detail by examining two industries, food products
and apparel, where the use of third-party standards and assurance services
has expanded especially rapidly in the last decade.
We conclude with a discussion of the implications for the “make or
buy” decision at the core of the theory of the firm (Coase 1937). In this
section of the paper we argue that as quasi-regulatory standards are
developed within various industries, and as performance to those standards
can be systematically evaluated using third-party inspectors and certifiers,
the costs of moving production outside of vertical firm hierarchies drop.
We believe this may be an important factor in accelerating the shift to
outsourcing that has been observed over the last two decades.

1

See discussion of the origins of the assurance service business in maritime and customs
inspection at Part 2.2 below.
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II. THE THIRD PARTY STANDARD-SETTING AND
2
ASSURANCE INDUSTRY.
As mentioned above, one of the most familiar types of third-party
standard-setting and
assurance service is the external auditor.
Independent external auditors have been critical to the development of
liquid financial markets in which individuals have reasonable confidence
that information provided by companies in which they invest is an
accurate reflection of the condition of the underlying business.3
Financial institutions that invest in or insure business ventures have
also long made use of other kinds of assurance services, including credit
rating, title services, inspections for hazardous materials such as asbestos,
and independent appraisals. But in recent years, the range of international
trade matters that are the subject of standardization, inspection,
verification, assurance, and certification has grown substantially.

A. THE IMPACT OF ISO
A major example and driver of the development of global
standards has been the widespread development since the mid-20th
century of international standards and technical specifications for a vast
array of products and processes by the ISO. Since its founding in 1946,
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has promulgated
tens of thousands of technical standards.4 ISO also publishes a list of
2

Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter are largely taken from Blair, Williams and Lin, 2007.

3

As an indication of the explosion in demand for audit services in developing countries
as those countries begin to develop liquid financial markets, the Chinese market for
accountants’ services grew by 304.5% over the years from 1999 to 2003. The market is
predicted to expand by 149% to $4,022 million by 2008. Auditing took the largest share
in China in 2003, accounting for 66.2 %. See http://www.euromonitor.com/.
4

“ISO”, from the Greek word for “equal,” was adopted as the “standardized” name for
the organization whose English name is the International Organization for
Standardization. ISO is a non-governmental organization whose member institutes are
part of the governmental structure of their countries, or are mandated by their
government. Typically, members have their roots in the private sector, having been set
up by national partnerships of industry associations. ISO uses technical committees
organized by subjects for standards development, and at this time has more than 200 such
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accreditation bodies that, in turn, accredit hundreds of organizations
around the world that are in the business of carrying out various
evaluations to determine if products or processes or management systems
are in conformance with the specifications in ISO standards.
Twenty years ago, in 1987, the ISO embarked on a significant new
path when it adopted the “ISO 9000” standards of quality management.5
These were the first sets of international standards that applied to
management systems that firms use to meet customer and regulatory
requirements, rather than to the characteristics of the products firms
produce or to units and methods of measuring those characteristics (RohtArriaza 1995). Since the ISO 9000 series of standards was adopted, many
firms have chosen to have their systems independently audited and
certified to them,6 and certification rapidly “became a de facto requirement
for doing business in Europe and other parts of the world,” as well as
being actually required for certain products sold in Europe and the United
States (Roht-Arriaza 1995, at 500).
The idea of creating standards for management systems embodied
in ISO 9000 has greatly fueled the development of the assurance industry
(Wood 2006). One reason is that, while buyer firms likely have the
appropriate expertise and incentive to inspect products to be sure they
meet specifications, buyer firms may not have the necessary expertise to
inspect the processes by which the products were made. Meanwhile,
supplier firms might have the necessary expertise, but are unlikely to have
committees. Since its founding in 1947, ISO has published more than 16,000 product,
technical, and performance standards for the characteristics and quality of raw materials
and other tangible production inputs, ranging from agricultural products, grades of oil and
gasoline, metals, ceramics and glues to electrical parts, nanotechnology, information
processing,
digital
equipment,
and
so
forth..
See
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html (last visited March 9, 2007).
ISO standards often form the basis for trade treaties and agreements. See also RohtArriaza, 1995.
5

Prior to publication of ISO 9000 standards, the ISO had focused largely on developing
internationally applicable technical standards for products and materials. ISO 9000 was
established under the Technical Committee No. 176 (TC176).
6

The ISO Survey 2004, available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prodsservices/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf (last visited July 3, 2006) provides data on the
number of establishments that have been certified to ISO 9000 and some other standards.
See also Wood, 2006.
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the necessary independence to inspect and certify the operation of their
own factories. Thus when it comes to process inspection, trading partners
may be more likely to agree to third-party inspection rather than first-party
(supplier firm) or second-party (buyer firm) inspections. Organizations
that were among the first to qualify as certifiers for ISO 9000 compliance
were generally European organizations that had already been providing
quality inspection services for various products; more recently, accounting
and audit firms have been expanding their business services portfolios to
add capability to perform ISO 9000 certifications.7
Data collected by ISO show that the number of firms and facilities
in the world that were ISO 9000 certified grew from 27,816 in 48
countries in 1993, to 670,399 in 154 countries by 2004 (ISO Survey).8
ISO provides no comparable data on the number of active certifying
bodies, but this dramatic expansion in the number of firms and plants that
have been certified could only be accomplished if the number of people
and firms doing certification work had also grown dramatically.
Once the demand for management quality and process certification
had developed sufficiently to support a private sector infrastructure to
certify management systems, it was only a small step for business,
government, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), and social
activists to look to these same sorts of certifying organizations to provide
assurance when asking companies to demonstrate that they are meeting
specified criteria for social performance.9 In 1996, the ISO adopted the
7

Organizations originally in financial auditing , such as KPMG Performance Registra
Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary in Canada of KPMG, LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers
in Canada , have extended their services to ISO certification. See
http://www.kpmg.ca/en/ms/performanceregistrar/services.html
and
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/5401765577527120852570CA001771D2
(last visited Aug. 10, 2006). However, a number of the certification bodies providing
ISO9000 certification, including BVQI, UL, SGS-ICS, and the like, were already in the
quality inspection services sector when the ISO 9000 standards were developed and
promulgated.
8

See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/pdf/survey10thcycle.pdf; at p. 15, and
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf, at p. 10
9

The American National Standards Institute (which is the U.S. organizational
representative to the ISO) notes growing pressures toward social performance
certification
on
its
website.
See
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1 (“During the first
years of the 21st Century, those involved in standards-setting activities clearly recognized
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ISO 14000 series of standards for evaluating environmental management
systems (Peglau 2002). By 2004, 90,569 facilities and firms, in 127
countries, had been certified as meeting these standards.10 And ISO is
currently developing standards for social responsibility as well.11

B. AN OVERVIEW OF ASSURANCE ORGANIZATIONS
In the past ten to fifteen years, numerous corporations, NGOs,
industry groups, and other organizations have developed codes of practice
for various industries. Firms that have long been in the business of
inspecting the quality, quantity, and weight of traded goods – especially
those that evaluate and certify conformance with ISO standards – have
quickly expanded to offer their services in auditing and certifying that firm
operations satisfy these new codes of practice. Firms such as SGS,
Intertek, DNV (Det Norske Veritas), RINA (Registro Italiano Navale), and
the TÜVs (Technischer Überwachungsverein) have all been in business
as inspectors of goods and ships in international trade since before 1900.
a growing need for globally relevant standards and related conformity assessment
mechanisms. ‘Market forces’ such as global trade and competition; societal issues such as
health, safety and the environment; an enhanced focus on consumer needs and
involvement and increasing interaction between public-sector and private-sector interests
were significantly impacting standardization and conformity assessment programs.
Standards themselves had expanded well beyond documents identifying product
specifications to instead focus on performance issues and to also include processes,
systems and personnel.”)
10

See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf, at p. 20.

11

See
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/3934883/3935096/home.htm
l?nodeid=4451259&vernum=0
(“The guidance standard will be published in 2008 as ISO 26000 and be voluntary to use.
It will not include requirements and will thus not be a certification standard. . . . The need
for organizations in both public and private sectors to behave in a socially responsible
way is becoming a generalized requirement of society. It is shared by the stakeholder
groups that are participating in the WG SR [Working Group on Social Responsibility] to
develop ISO 26000: industry, government, labour, consumers, nongovernmental
organizations and others, in addition to geographical and gender-based balance.” ISO
asserts that these standards are not intended to be the basis for third-party certifications,
however.
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They all operate globally and have had a quasi-official status as inspectors
for customs officials or government agencies regulating products moving
in international markets. All have recently expanded their business to do
audits and inspections to verify compliance with social responsibility
standards.12
In addition, dozens of new firms have entered the business as
certification bodies, including firms like Cal Safety Compliance Corp.
(CSCC), ALGI, and Hong Kong Quality Assurance Agency (HKQAA).
CSCC, for example, is a division of Specialized Technology Resources,
Inc. in Los Angeles. It was established in 1991 to provide social
responsibility auditing services, initially in the garment sector and now in
a broad range of industries including home furnishings, food and
agriculture, cosmetics, toys, and high-tech products, and has operations in
more than 110 countries. Similarly, ALGI, headquartered in Nyack, NY,
was founded in 1994 by several former Department of Labor officials to
do social accountability auditing. TransFair USA was launched in 1998
and began "fair trade" certification of coffee purchased from developing
countries in 1999. It has since expanded to certification of other food
products. HKQA was established in 1989 by the Hong Kong government
to do social compliance audits.13

12

DNV, established in 1864, primarily focuses on risk management certification and
consulting, in particular for maritime, oil and gas, process and transportation industries.
See http://www.dnv.com/. Intertek can be traced to three separate companies in 1885,
including Thomas Edison’s Lamp Testing Bureau. It initially provided maritime
surveying and testing of electrical equipment; it now provides testing services and risk
management for a wide range of businesses. See http://www.intertek.com/. RINA
(Registro Italiano Navale), a company established in 1861 in Genova, has been providing
ship classification and certification services since its establishment. See
http://www.rina.it/. SGS, originally founded in 1878 in Rouen as a French grain shipment
inspection house and later registered in Geneva in 1919, provides inspection services of
traded goods, product testing services, and certification services for products, systems or
services. See www.sgs.com/.
13

See CSCC, at http://www.cscc-online.com; ALGI, at
http://www.algi.net/en/company.htm; IKQAA, at http://www.hkqaa.org/index.html.
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C. “PROFESSIONALIZATION” OF THE STANDARD-SETTING AND
ASSURANCE INDUSTRY

The assurance business is itself largely unregulated. Standards are
often set in collaborative processes led by industry trade groups, NGOs,
and/or government regulators.
For example, a “Voluntary Carbon
Standard” (VCS) that provides “quality assurance for certification of
credible voluntary offsets” was announced recently by The Climate
Group, a nonprofit formed in 2004 as a consortium of industry, nonprofit
groups and emissions market specialists including the International
Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and the World Business Council
for Sustainable Development.14 But there are no well-established and
accepted training procedures or professional standards for those who
“audit” non-financial performance indicators. Yet, by its nature it is a
business that is rife with potential for abuse. This is because, as is true for
financial audits, inspections and evaluations of systems and operating
practices are usually arranged and purchased by a supplier company in
order to provide assurance to a purchasing company that the supplier can
meet, or has met contract terms, or complied with certain norms and
standards. And, as is true in the business of providing financial audits,
individual auditors might have incentives to accept payoffs in exchange
for approval by the auditors. Likewise, the client firms whose facilities are
being inspected might have incentives to offer such payoffs if it is cheaper
for them to make the side payments than it is to comply with the codes or
standards. Indeed, factory owners in developing countries who are being
asked by their developed-country customers to subject themselves to audit,
frequently complain that the demands for audits are a form of extortion
(Roberts, et. al. 2006). Inspection organizations also complain of finding
double books, or that workers have been instructed to answer questions in
certain ways, or other deceptive practices. Id. And factory owners
complain of having to meet multiple, sometimes conflicting standards, and
be subject to repetitive inspections to satisfy different customers. Id.
Suppliers of financial auditing services long ago figured out that
there are two basic mechanisms for addressing this problem:
professionalization of the providers of the service, and investments by the
14

See “Emissions Trading: Consortium Issues Carbon Standard to Certify Credits
Earned in Voluntary Carbon Markets,” Daily Environment, No. 223, Nov. 30, 2007.
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providers in reputations for independence and honesty. Professional
accountants are now required to go through formal training and licensing
by organizations representing accountants, and they typically organize
themselves into large, high-visibility firms with substantial interest in
maintaining reputations for honesty, independence, and competence.
Those firms, in turn, have incentives to see to it that their auditors are
competent, disciplined, and behave in professional ways.
These things are only beginning to happen in the non-financial
assurance business. Although the leading international firms in the
business have substantial reputational capital at risk, many smaller, newer
assurance firms are in the business that may not yet have established
reputations. Moreover, there appears to be only one significant
professional organization that offers any standardization and assurance of
the assurance professionals themselves.15 This is the International
Register of Certificated Auditors (IRCA), a UK organization based in
London that was founded in 1984 as part of a UK government initiative to
establish and certify quality management standards. IRCA certifies
auditors of management systems, approves training organizations and
certifies their auditor training courses. It claims to have certified more than
13,750 auditors in over 120 countries worldwide. Generally, however,
there is “very little oversight” over the assurance industry (Wood 2006).
15

Several Chinese government agencies have taken steps in the direction of providing
some sort of government regulation of the inspection and assurance business, however.
In 2003, the Chinese government promulgated the Certification and Accreditation Act,
under which certification institutions are required to obtain governmental approval, meet
the minimum capital requirement (RMB 3 million, which is about USD 407,000), and
comply with conduct standards addressing potential conflicts of interest (e.g., institutions
cannot accept financial contributions that would impair their independence; auditors
cannot be employed by two certification institutions simultaneously). In 2004, the
Chinese government passed Regulations on Auditors, Certification trainers and
consultants, under which auditors, trainers and consultants are required to be registered
with the government. To become registered, auditors, trainers, and consultants must meet
certain eligibility requirements, take various courses, and pass a series of exams.
Currently the registration process is administered by the China Certification and
Accreditation Association (CCAA), a non-profit organization subject to the supervision
of the Chinese government. See CCAA, http://www.ccaa.org.cn/ccaa/default.html. As of
Dec. 31, 2005, there were 55,340 registered auditors for ISO 9001 certification and
17,550 registered auditors for ISO 14001certification in China. See Certification and
Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of China, ALMANAC OF
ASSURANCE SERVICES IN CHINA 499 (2006) [Zhongguo renzheng renke nian jian
2006].
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III. FACTORS CAUSING PROLIFERATION OF
STANDARDS AND GROWTH IN DEMAND FOR
ASSURANCE SERVICES.
A number of different factors seem to be at work that, together, are driving
the rapid proliferation of standards and associated growth in demand for
assurance services, as well as in the supply of businesses that offer their
services as inspectors and auditors to meet this demand.

A. EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INCREASED RELIANCE
ON OUTSOURCING, AND LONGER SUPPLY CHAINS.
Other scholars have written at length about the growth in international
commerce in the last few decades,16 and the extent to which corporations
in developed countries now contract with developing country firms for
parts manufacturing, assembly, testing, and even sales (e.g., call centers)
and record-keeping (Geis 2006; Lohr 2006). When products are made in
factories owned by, and under the immediate supervision of managerial
employees of a large firm, that firm can directly implement its own
quality, timely delivery, labor, and environmental operating norms and
standards. When the same firm contracts with a factory owner in
Bangladesh, or Vietnam, or Costa Rica to make the products, the parties to
the contract will probably need to develop detailed product specifications
and alternative mechanisms, other than direct managerial control, to make
certain that the products are made according to these specifications (both
as to product characteristics and quality, and as to the processes used).
These mechanisms may range from the hiring firm having its own
inspectors in the contractor’s plant at all times, to having third party
inspectors check the plant's operations from time to time, to relying solely
on inspection of the final product at the time the hiring firm takes
possession of it. This last mechanism may be widely-used for simple
16

The international trade literature in particular tracks this growth. See e.g., International
Monetary Fund and World Bank, (2001); OECD (2006).
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commodity-type products made in uncontroversial ways. But, they are less
likely to be effective where there are hidden attributes of a product, or the
process by which it was made, that are important to the buying firm.

B. THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF PRODUCTS AND INCREASED
DIVISION OF LABOR.
More of the products being exchanged between firms in international
markets are intermediate products that must meet strict specifications as
inputs or components of other products, or are made utilizing processes
that are controversial (e.g., strip mining, farming with patented seeds, or
fertilizers and pest control chemicals, or labor-intensive assembly
potentially involving sweatshop conditions or child labor) (Arndt &
Kierzkowski 2001; Kysar 2004). It is common, for example, for products
to be designed in one country, components to be purchased from suppliers
in other countries, assembly work done in yet another country, all for
shipment to markets in a number of other countries.17
At each step of the way, the corporations that are organizing all of
this productive activity need to be able to control for quality, conformance
to specifications, timely delivery of intermediate products to final
assembly plants, and safety in both the manufacturing and use of the
product. Throughout this process, inventories must be managed for costefficiency, and to provide required levels of customer service (Schary &
Skjott-Larsen 1998; Jespersen, Skjott-Larsen 2005; and Ayres 2001). For
such products, the purchasing company may have compelling reasons to
want to specify performance features and monitor steps in the production
process in one way or another.

17

Grossman and Helpman (2005) report that 30% of a particular American car’s value
“goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and advanced technology,
7.5% to Germany for design, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5% to the
United Kingdom for advertising and marketing services and 1.5% to Ireland for data
processing. This means that only 37% of the production value …is generated in the
United States” (p.36)).
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C. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATIONS.
The growth of the third-party assurance industry based on ISO
standard-setting has also been fueled by developments in the regulation of
international trade. Efforts in Europe to facilitate intra-European trade by
harmonizing regulatory requirements initially emphasized compliance
with European technical standards as a necessary condition for selling any
goods in Europe. Thus, the standards developed by the European standardsetting agency, the Comite Europeen de Normalization (CEN), were
applied to any goods sold in Europe. This led non-European companies to
argue that technical and other standards, such as for quality and product
safety, should be developed by the international standard-setting process
of the ISO, rather than through a European process. That position was
persuasive to negotiators developing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 1994/World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, which thus provides that where international
standards for technical requirements exist, member states should use those
standards as the basis for their own technical requirements (Roht-Arriaza
1995).18 As a consequence, ISO certification became necessary for a
growing number of products, and as ISO standards expanded beyond
technical specifications to quality and environmental management
systems, a “huge industry of auditors, certifiers and accreditation bodies
has emerged to serve these expanding certification needs” (Wood 2006).

D. THE GROWING DEMAND FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY,
ACCEPTABLE LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE, AND
ACCEPTABLE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS.

In the last decade, for reasons we discuss below, many global
corporations have begun seeking assurance that firms they do business
with can meet social and environmental standards, in addition to technical

18

See id. at 494-95, citing the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, . Apr. 15,
1994, art. 2.4, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1428 (1994).
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and quality standards.19 This development is causing corporations in
developing countries that are suppliers to more well-known global
corporations to insist that their suppliers, in turn, also meet certain
standards.
In this way, multinational firms may be drawing more small and
local firms in more countries into their orbit. As this happens, we are
observing a movement toward global standard setting and the associated
use of third-party assurance firms to certify that standards are being met,
even by supplier firms that still operate and sell primarily in their home
country.20
1. RECOGNITION OF THE RISKS TO GLOBAL BRANDS FROM PROBLEMS IN THE
SUPPLY CHAINS

Global corporations are also more inclined in the last two decades
to insist that suppliers, as well as their own facilities, meet certain social
standards because they recognize that each link in the supply chain
potentially exposes the whole operation to risks associated with that link.

19

One indication of the new attention by business firms to social and environmental
performance is the publication in early 2007 of the first edition of the CSR
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES DIRECTORY, which lists 443 organizations worldwide under 49
different service categories, offering assistance in meeting so-called “corporate social
responsibility”
(CSR)
norms
and
standards
See
http://www.ethicalperformance.com/csrdirectory/index.php?PHPSESSID=c78e01516410
14186bd7a2fa9d305c49 (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
20

Konzelmann, et. al., 2005, argue that IKEA, for example, is transferring its standards
for quality, efficiency, and socially responsible behavior “globally to the mutual benefit
of all the system’s stakeholder groups” by implementing its “IKEA Way on Purchasing
Home Furnishing Products (IWAY) throughout its global supply chain.” To implement
its standards, “IKEA contracts with independent auditors to inspect and monitor all
suppliers with whom the company does business on an on-going basis,” according to
Konzelmann, et. al., at 19. Similarly, British Petroleum and Shell are imposing
requirements on smaller companies that provide maritime services to raise their standards
for health, environment and safety and to secure certification of having met those higher
standards. Interview with Anne-Maree O’Connor, Core Ratings (Member of the DNV
Group), London, June 26, 2006 (notes on file with authors). That supply chain pressures
can affect the standards of conduct expected of companies is consistent with the legal
transplant literature. See Vandenberg, 2007; Miller, 2003.
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The experience of companies in the chemical industry (beginning
with companies operating in Canada), illustrate the pattern. Canadian
chemical firms recognized as long ago as 1983 that risks in the handling of
hazardous wastes in foreign operations can affect reputation and
profitability of their worldwide organizations. To address these risks, a
group of chemical companies led by Dow Canada and the Canadian
Chemical Producers Association (CCPA), with encouragement from the
Canadian government, agreed to develop a set of safe operating principles
(O’Conner 2006). The 1984 explosion of a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal,
India, accelerated the development and adoption of these principles, which
came to be called the Responsible Care Initiative (RCI). Other chemical
companies joined the initiative in an effort to improve the industry’s
reputation (Bélanger 2005).
The initiative originally included six standards for safe practice in
chemical production, transport and control.21 Although the standards had
been adopted by numerous chemical companies by 1988,22 by 1993,
chemical firms were learning, as Responsible Care executive Brian Wastle
explained to us, that the mere fact that “CEOs stated they had met their
commitment meant nothing to an untrusting public.” So the standards were
expanded to include provision for verification and ongoing improvement
of performance.
Responsible Care executive Wastle reports that the standards now
require that “teams of industry experts, public advocates and local
citizens,” review each company every three years, and “write a consensus
report summarizing the verification process and players, opportunities for
improvement, findings, required corrective action and successful
21

The six categories of the original standards included 1) Community awareness and
emergency response; 2) Research and development;
3) Manufacturing;
4)
Transportation; 5) Distribution; and 6) Hazardous waste management. See Canada’s
Chemical Producers:
Chemistry – a part of everyday life/Responsible Care,
http://www.ccpa.ca/ResponsibleCare/ (last visited June 22, 2006).

22

Chemical companies that were part of the original Responsible Care Initiative include
Dow Chemical Canada, ICI subsidiary CIL, Union Carbide Canada, Imperial Oil
Chemicals, H.L. Blachford, Rhone-Poulenc Canada, Ethyl Canada, Rohm & Haas
Canada, Hoescht Celanese, General Chemical, Allied Chemicals, Shell (chemical
division), Cyanamide Canada, and Polysar. Email from Brian Wastle, Vice President,
Responsible Care®, Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association, Ottowa Ontario, June
22, 2006
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practices,” with verification certificates awarded once the work is
completed.
Similarly, firms that use highly labor-intensive manufacturing and
assembly processes, such as apparel and toy manufacturers, have
responded to media attacks on firms whose products were allegedly made
in "sweatshop" conditions23 by developing codes of practice for their own
factories and for supplier factories. But these firms have also learned that
announcing codes of practice is not sufficient to solve the problem24 – they
must also develop implementation strategies and arrange for inspection
and certification to be sure the codes are in fact implemented.
To enhance brand protection by tackling the implementation
problem in one industry, for example, a group of corporations in the
apparel and “sewn products” industries, together with industry trade
associations,25 provided seed money and technical support to form a thirdparty standard-setting organization called WRAP (Worldwide Responsible
Apparel Production) in the late 1990s. WRAP was given the goal of
establishing worker safety and human rights performance standards to be
applied at the factory level, and to implement inspection and certification
procedures.26
WRAP is now formally an independent non-profit
23

The iconic examples here include the negative publicity in the late 1990’s surrounding
sweatshop working conditions in manufacturing plants making Nike products and Kathy
Lee Gifford brand apparel for Wal-Mart. Williams, 1999; Schoenberger, 2000.

24

Wal-Mart has posted 10 "Guiding Ethical Principles" on its website, and states that it
periodically inspects its factories for implementation, and yet continues to come under
fire for tolerating poor working conditions in supplier factories. Konzelmann, 2005;
Brooksbank 2006; Greenhouse, 2006; Ellis, 2006.

25

In 1998, several prominent U.S. apparel producers approached the American Apparel
Manufacturers Association (which subsequently merged with the Footwear Industries of
American and the Fashion Association to form the American Apparel and Footwear
Association) to work collaboratively to develop and implement labor, health, safety and
environmental standards at the factory level.
See WRAP website at
http://www.wrapapparel.org/ (last visited June 21, 2006).
26

The first result of the AAMA initiative was the twelve Worldwide Responsible
Apparel Production Principles -- standards of labor practices, factory conditions, and
environmental and customs compliance. The AAMA Board of Directors publicly
endorsed these principles in 1998. For the next two years, the Association worked with
producers, public interest groups, and development agencies to “design a process and
develop an organization to monitor and certify factories for compliance—in hundreds of
details—with the principles. ”Statement of AAMA Board of Directors, available at
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organization, governed by a board of directors of which, by the
organization’s bylaws, more than half must be unaffiliated with the
apparel industry.27 Factory certification by WRAP requires that the
facilities meet initial standards, as certified by an approved independent
monitor, and be subject to unannounced audits, and annual renewal.28
The awareness of supply-chain risks is amplified by recognition on
the part of corporations and their investors that a large share of the
economic value that firms create is tied to their “brand value.” But, as
discussed above, brand value is only as good as its weakest link because
expansion in international travel and communications makes it harder for
firms to hide their "dirty laundry.” Wal-Mart, for example, has undertaken
a massive public-relations campaign, including drawing attention to its
new code of ethics, to attempt to respond to critics who charge that its
suppliers violate international labor norms.29 Although its code notably
lacks both specifics about standards of treatment for workers, and
enforcement mechanisms,30 Wal-Mart may very well not be the worst

http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Congent&pa=whowpage&pid=26 (last
visited June 21, 2006) The fruit of this work was the incorporation of WRAP in 2000 as
a "501 [c] 6" organization.
27

See http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=5.
One of us (Blair) has served as an independent board member of WRAP since 2005.

28

The organization is working to obtain commitments from apparel firms and retailers
that products that carry certain brands must be made in factories that are certified.
O’Rourke, 2005, describes and compares six major international programs that provide
what he calls “non-governmental regulation” in the apparel and sewn products industries,
including WRAP, Social Accountability International (SA8000), Fair Labor Association,
Ethical Trading Initiative, Fair Wear Foundation, and Worker Rights Consortium.
WRAP now has three levels of certification, with level C requiring 6 month renewal,
level B requiring annual renewal, and level A, representing the highest level of
compliance, requiring only biannual renewal.

29

Wal-Mart's website notes that its "Global Ethics Office" was established in June, 2004,
and, on June 4, 2004, according to the website, "Wal-Mart released a revised Global
Statement of Ethics to communicate our ethical standards to all Wal-Mart facilities and
stakeholders. The Global Ethics Office provides guidance in making ethical decisions
based on the Global Statement of Ethics and a process for anonymous reporting of
suspected ethics violation. . . "
30

"Wal-Mart's principles are:
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offender among U.S. retailers in its tolerance of labor abuses in supplier
factories. But because of the high visibility of its brand, it is believed to be
very influential in establishing industry norms, and hence may be targeted
more intensely by NGOs and other activists than smaller, less well-known
firms.
2. THE INCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF NGOS, ACTIVISTS, AND INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS.

As corporations find themselves in the glare of the NGO spotlight
for their social and environmental practices, a growing number of firms
are looking for better ways to make sure they know what is actually
happening out in their supply chains. Moreover, activists and investors are
increasingly asking corporations to provide information about their social
performance. Certain sectors of the investment community, such as public
pension funds and the self-described “SRI” funds (Socially Responsible
Investment) in the EU, UK and US, and insurance investors in the UK, are
increasingly looking at the social and environmental performance of their
portfolio companies and those companies’ trading partners in an attempt to
identify risks associated with the portfolio firms as well as their trading
partners out in the supply chain.31 This, in turn, has created demand for

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Follow the law at all times.
Be honest and fair
Never manipulate, misrepresent, abuse or conceal information
Avoid conflicts of interest between work and personal affairs
Never discriminate against anyone
Never act unethically – even if someone else instructs you to do so
Never ask someone to act unethically
Seek assistance if you have questions about the Statement of Ethics or if you face an ethical
dilemma
9. Cooperate with any investigation of a possible ethics violation
10. Report ethics violations or suspected violations
31

Brooksbank, 2006, reports an announcement by Norwegian Government Pension Fund
that it had divested its holdings in Wal-Mart on the grounds that the fund would "incur an
unacceptable risk of contributing to serious or systematic violations of human rights by
maintaining its investments in the company." Another example of investors being
concerned about social compliance is the Association of British Insurers in London,
which represents 94% of UK insurers. Insurance companies in the UK offer savings and
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services of firms that can audit the quality of the non-financial information
being produced. Some major accounting firms, such as KPMG and
PricewaterhousCoopers, have recently established global sustainability
practice groups, for example, with the specialized expertise necessary to
attest to environmental and social data.32
The activism of NGOs is accompanied by a proliferation of social
and environmental responsibility standards over the past ten years. These
initiatives have been developed by states, public/private partnerships,
multi-stakeholder negotiation processes, industries and companies,
institutional investors, functional groups such as accountancy firms and
social assurance consulting groups (many of which did not exist more than
about five years ago), NGOs, and non-financial ratings agencies (Conley
& Williams 2005; Williams & Conley 2005; Williams 2004).
One example (among many) is Social Accountability 8000 (SA
8000), a project of Social Accountability International. SA 8000 is an
auditable certification standard based on international labor and human
rights standards.33 SA8000 also provides a social accountability
management system to guide firms in implementing standards and to
demonstrate ongoing conformance with the standards. In particular, to
meet SA 8000 standards requires third-party certification of individual
production facilities such as factories or farms, based upon an inspection
investment products in addition to insurance, and control 17% of all UK company
publicly-listed equity.
See http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/Key%20facts%202005_LR.pdf
(last visited Feb. 14, 2007). These insurers ask their clients to provide information on
environmental, social, and governance risks. See Part 3.5 below.
32

See KPMG Sustainability Services, available at
http://www.kpmg.nl/site.asp?Id=40378 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007); Price
Waterhouse/Coopers Sustainability Practice Website, available at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/challenges.nsf/docid/58E92287890B5314852570980064AC
C2 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
33

This standard is a voluntary, universal standard for companies interested in auditing
and certifying labor practices in their facilities and those of their suppliers and vendors,
based on the principles of international human rights norms as described in International
Labour Organisation conventions, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Overview of SA8000, available
at http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=473 (last visited
August 10, 2006).)
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by SAI-approved inspectors and other third party inspectors. Corporations
that seek SA 8000 stamp of approval must stipulate in written purchase
contracts with all suppliers that those suppliers conform to the SA 8000
standards.
In addition to apparel and chemicals, discussed above, a number of
other industries have promulgated voluntary corporate social responsibility
standards that incorporate third-party certification that products being sold
have been produced, harvested or extracted according to the standards,
such as certification of conflict-free diamonds,34 sustainable fisheries35 and
forestry;36 and fair-trade goods such as coffee, tea, cocoa and cotton.37
Thousands of individual companies have also adopted voluntary codes of
conduct establishing their standards for responsible business behavior, and
some companies then engage third-party certifiers to ensure that their
suppliers and subsidiaries are meeting those codes. The development of
codes and standards and the increasing expectation that global firms take
responsibility for implementing and enforcing these standards throughout
34

The Kimberly Process, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080. The
Kimberly Process is a joint government, international diamond industry and civil society
initiative to ensure that shipments of diamonds are free of “conflict diamonds” that have
been sold to support wars in such countries as Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. All significant diamond producing and trading
centers, with the exception of Liberia, are now operating within the framework of the
Kimberly Process.

35

The Marine Stewardship Council certification process, available at
http://www.msc.org. The Marine Stewardship Council is a global non-profit that has
created an environmental standard for well-managed fisheries, according to which thirdparty certifiers can grant labels that assure that fish have been grown in well-managed
fisheries, or caught according to environmentally sustainable principles. As with many of
the certification schemes for products, an important part of the certification is of “chain of
custody” procedures that attempt to ensure the value of the certified label.

36

Forest Stewardship Council: Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, available
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/fscprinciples.html. The Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) is an international body composed of industry participants, transnational
environmental NGOs and social justice NGOs, strongly influenced by international
standard setting processes at the ISO, and which accredits organizations to certify timber
and forest products as meeting the FSC standard for sustainable forest management.
Meidinger, 2006.

37

See http://www.fairtrade.net/certification_mark.html for an overview of the fair trade
requirements.
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their supply chains have greatly expanded the role of third-party standardsetting and assurance in global business, even though the early impetus for
this expansion was driven by demand quality, speed, timely-delivery and
cost control.

E. THE GROWING DEMANDS FROM INVESTORS FOR
TRANSPARENCY, QUALITY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Institutional investor networks are also asking for improved quality
and quantity of information from their portfolio companies. Investors in
the UK have been leaders in this development. In 2002, for example, the
Association of British Insurers (ABI), which represents insurers that
control 17% of stocks listed in the UK, issued its Disclosure Guidelines on
Social Responsibility.38 In those guidelines, which it updated in 2005 and
2007, the ABI stated that it expects portfolio companies to provide
information on an annual basis about how boards of directors evaluate and
are addressing environmental, social, and governance risks, in the context
of the entire range of risks and opportunities facing the company.39
Climate change has become a particularly salient environmental
risk that U.K. investor networks target in their disclosure requests. One
example is the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a process by a group
now comprised of 284 British, European and American institutional
investors, with $41 trillion of money under management.40 The CDP
elicits information on an annual basis from companies worldwide about
the financial risks to the companies from the physical effects of climate
change or from regulatory efforts to mitigate those physical changes, and
about company actions to manage and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In 2007, CDP sought information from 2,400 of the world’s largest quoted
companies, by market capitalization, expanding its requests beyond the
Global 500 to include the largest companies in various developed and
38

See http://www.abi.org.uk/Newsreleases/viewNewsRelease.asp?nrid=3676.

39

See http://www.politics.co.uk/press-releases/domesticpolicy/environment/environment/abi-publishes-responsible-investment-disclosureguidelines-$464874.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).

40

See Carbon Disclosure Website and Reports, available at http://www.cdproject.net.
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rapidly developing markets, as well as the largest companies in transport
and utilities. These pressures from institutional investors in the UK and
Europe have been an important impetus for new requirements in those
jurisdictions for companies to discuss future risks to the business from
social, environmental and community matters in their Annual Reports.41
At the same time, firms and investors increasingly recognize that
traditional financial measures fail to capture the value within companies
from such intangible factors as employees’ knowledge, training and
development (Blair & Wallman 2001; Lev 2001; Eccles 2006). The
recognition that such factors are important is driving a search by
corporations, consultants, auditors and institutional investors for auditable
non-financial metrics that can be used to measure and report on company
performance in developing and protecting important intangible assets such
as employee capabilities, brand, and reputation.
The pressure on companies to collect and disclose more relevant
non-financial information, has been accompanied by pressure to have their
approach to assembling such data subject to third-party review. In 2005,
52% of Global 250 companies issued non-financial, sustainability reports,
including social, environmental and economic data, and of these, 30%
included independent, third-party assurance of the quality and accuracy of
the underlying data. Major accounting firms currently dominate the nonfinancial assurance and attestation market, issuing attestation statements
for 60% of those sustainability reports that are independently verified.42
At least two global standards are under development for the
assurance of non-financial reports. In March, 2003, the UK based
41

As of 2005, companies in Europe are required to include “a fair review of the
development and performance of the company’s business and of its position, together
with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that it faces.” In addition, “to
the extent necessary for an understanding of the company’s development, performance or
position, the analysis shall include both financial and where appropriate, nonfinancial key
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating
to environmental and employee matters.” Directive of Parliament 2003/51, art. 1, 14(a),
2003 O.J. (L 178), at 18. For a further discussion of these requirements, see Williams &
Conley, 2005.
42

KPMG Global Sustainability Services, KPMG International Survey of Corporate
Responsibility Reporting, 2005(2005), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/NR/rdonlyres/66422F7F-35AD-4256-9BF8F36FACCA9164/0/KPMGIntlCRSurvey2005.pdf (last visited 7/3/2006).
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AccountAbility organization issued AA 1000AS, which focuses on
evaluating the materiality, completeness and responsiveness of a
company’s reporting to its various stakeholder groups.43 In December,
2003, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)’s International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), which is the body
responsible for issuing international accounting and auditing standards,
issued guidance for accounting firms to use in order to guide their
assurance work for non-financial reports. This standard is applicable to
any assurance work by accountants after January 1, 2005, and was needed,
according to the IFAC, to meet the increasing demand for assurance
reports on “[e]nvironmental, social and sustainability reports, information
systems, internal control, corporate governance processes and compliance
with grant conditions, contracts and regulations.”44

IV. THIRD PARTY ASSURANCE IN FOOD PRODUCTS
AND APPAREL INDUSTRIES
Extensive use of third party inspection, assurance, and certification
services has been noted by scholars who have studied and analyzed the
reorganization of specific industries in recent years to use supply chain
production methods spanning multiple countries. Two prominent
examples of such industries are food products and apparel. In this section
we discuss the growing role of standards in production processes and of
third party inspectors to help enforce standards in these two industries.

43

See http://www.accountability.org.uk/news/default.asp?id=158 for a description of AA
1000AS and related technical materials.

44

See International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000: Assurance
Engagements other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information See IFAC
Press Release, IAASB Issues a New Framework and Standard for Assurance Engagement,
Jan.23, 2004, available at
http://www.ifac.org/News/LatestReleases.tmpl?NID=10748895832047605.
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A. SUPPLY CHAIN CHARACTERISTICS
The organization of production through “chains” of firms in
different countries, linked by contracts and long-term relationships in
which suppliers produce goods to meet detailed specifications by buying
firms, has been discussed extensively in the literature on “supply chain
management.”45 An important recent article in this literature categorizes
governance arrangements in what it calls “global value chains” into five
types, which they label “hierarchy,” “captive,” “relational,” “modular,”
and “market” (Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon 2005).
“Hierarchy” refers to production within a single, verticallyintegrated corporation, where that corporation can directly control the
activities of the overseas subsidiaries or subunits that are designing the
products, acquiring raw materials, making components, assembling them
into finished products, shipping the products to market, and marketing
them. Hierarchical governance, these authors argue, is most likely to be
used when the production chain is especially complex, with substantial
interdependencies between steps of production, and when it requires firmspecific, or relationship-specific investments and a high level of
coordination between steps.
At the other end of the spectrum, “market” governance refers to
production carried out by a series of independent firms each producing
generic products that are sold in arm’s length transactions, perhaps even
on a “spot” market, to the trader or broker or firm carrying out the next
step or activity. Market governance is more likely to be used where
products are simple, outputs of each step are commodities, and production
steps are not interdependent. These two types correspond to the broad
alternatives identified by Oliver Williamson in his classic work on
transactions costs, and the choice between “markets” and “hierarchies”
(Williamson 1975). If production is governed by an internal hierarchy
there is no need to rely on standarization and third party assurance, since
the firm can monitor and manage the production process directly.
45

See, e.g., PHILIP B. SCHARY & TAGE SKJOTT-LARSEN, MANAGING THE GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAIN (Copenhagen Bus. Sch. Press 2d ed. 2001) (describing the supply chain
literature); BIRGIT DAM JESPERSEN, TAGE SKJOTT-LARSEN, SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2005) (giving a varied picture of supply chain
management); JAMES B. AYERS, HANDBOOK OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (2001)
(presenting a broad view of the supply chain).
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Likewise, production governed by markets requires no third party
inspection or assurance because the process by which products are
produced is not relevant to the buyer, terms of engagement are set by
competition, and the products themselves can be inspected before or at the
time they are purchased.
A large portion of goods and services that move in international
commerce are not commodities, however, but involve some intermediate
level of complexity, specificity, and coordination problems. The design,
production, and marketing of those goods are increasingly carried out
through some intermediate governance arrangement, involving a
combination of contractual, network, and norm-driven relationships
between firms in the chain Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon (2005) classify
these intermediate arrangements as “modular,” “relational,” and “captive,”
according to the degree to which the “lead firm” in the chain of producers
controls the other firms.
“Captive” governance refers to “networks of small suppliers [that]
are transactionally dependent on much larger buyers” (Gereffi, Humphrey
& Sturgeon 2005, at 84). In such arrangements the large buyer firms often
have substantial market power in relation to the small firms, and exercise a
large degree of control over them. This control may be exercised by
having managers and inspectors from the buyer firm supervise production
within the supplier firm factories. Alternatively, and with growing
frequency, both buyer firms and supplier firms may prefer that contractors
submit to third-party inspection, verification, and certification (Humphrey
& Schmitz 2003).
In the apparel industry for example, if lead firms turn to
contractors merely to assemble cut fabric according to detailed instructions
from the lead firm in the supply chain, this relationship is considered an
example of “captive” governance. Contractors that interpret designs,
convert sketches and general instructions to detailed patterns, find their
own sources of fabrics and trim components, and cut the fabric as well as
assemble the components, by contrast, are considered “full package
suppliers,” involved in a “relational” governance arrangement with the
branded apparel firms and retailers.
“Relational” governance applies to production carried out across
multiple independent firms, involving “complex interactions between
buyers and sellers,” “mutual dependence,” and “high levels of asset
specificity.” Here the firms in the production chain do not control each
other, but since each will have to make some investments that are specific
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to the relationship, each may need reassurance that the other party can and
will deliver on its end of the contract. Third-party inspection and/or
certification can help provide that assurance.
In “modular” production, the product is one that can be assembled
from modules or components for which the buyer’s specifications, even
highly sophisticated and complex ones, can be “codified” and adequately
interpreted and carried out by supplier firms that are capable of carrying
out sophisticated production activities. If production activities can be
separated into modules, the buying firm may need to exercise little or no
control over the supplier firm and the chain of production may be
governed by “turn-key” contracts between otherwise independent firms.
Third-party inspection and certification is most likely to play a role in
“modular” type of governance at the stage when the contract is negotiated,
to reassure the buying firm that the supplier firm has the capabilities
required to carry out the contract
Modular production is also facilitated by the development of
product and process standards that are measurable and quantifiable and
that reduce uncertainty at the interfaces between steps in the production
process and misfits between components of the finished product. These
standards may often be set by third-parties, and in some cases may be
enforced by third-party inspection regimes. The U.S. electronics industry
provides an example of supply-chain production in which major activities
have been “modularized,” so that “standardized protocols for handing-off
computerized design files and highly automated and standardized process
technologies [make] it easy for lead firms to switch and share contractors,
and [reduce] the build-up of specific assets,” according to Gereffi,
Humphrey & Sturgeon (2005, at 95).
For a variety of reasons, pure market governance and pure
hierarchical governance arrangements are becoming much less likely to be
used in many industries, and intermediate governance arrangements in
supply chains are becoming more common. And it is in these intermediate
governance arrangements where we are most likely to find deployment
and use of third-party inspection, certification, and assurance
organizations in supply chains. As it happens, both the food products
industry and the apparel industry are increasingly dominated by supply
chain governance arrangements of these intermediate types rather than by
pure markets or by vertically integrated hierarchical firms.
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B. FOOD PRODUCTS
The supply chains that bring fresh produce and processed food to
grocery store shelves46 have become thoroughly “globalized,” in the sense
that production and distribution activities are functionally integrated and
coordinated across several countries (Gereffi 1999). Until about a decade
ago, however, governance arrangements were generally wholly marketoriented, with some steps of food production hierarchically controlled by
branded food processing companies. Wholesale grain dealers, for
example, bought grain in mostly anonymous markets, both domestic and
foreign, and food product companies bought produce or corn syrup or
flour or meat from first level processors and wholesalers, and transformed
them into branded products which were then sold in market transactions to
grocery stores. Government agencies inspected and graded many
wholesale food products, and branded food processors tested purchased
products for quality (Hatanaka, Bain & Busch 2005), but there was very
little backward integration by food companies into growing or harvesting
activities, and very little forward integration into retailing. Government
agencies established certain safety and quality standards, graded products
such as milk and meat, and inspected processing facilities. Supermarkets
generally took responsibility only for how the products were handled once
they hit the store warehouse.
In the last fifteen to twenty years, however, consumers have begun
paying much more attention to food safety and healthfulness issues, as
well as to issues related to how the food is produced, including use of
pesticides, fertilizers, preservatives, and other chemicals, human rights and
fair wages for farm workers, clearing of rainforests, renewability of
fisheries, and treatment of animals. Moreover, consumers have shown a
willingness to pay higher prices for food products that satisfy these
preferences. Grocery store chains and some restaurant chains have seized
on the interest by consumers in these issues to find ways to differentiate
their products by the process by which they reach consumers, as well as by
quality (Hatanaka, Bain & Busch 2005). Thus many retail food companies,
46

Although a growing share of food consumed in the U.S. is restaurant food, we discuss
the evolution of the industry that supplies food to grocery store. Many of the same
factors are driving similar changes in the supply of food to branded restaurant chains, so
we mention these factors as well.
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especially high-end grocery stores and high-visibility branded restaurant
chains have moved away from pure market approaches to supply chain
management. Instead, these firms have been steadily building supply
chains that are more “relational,” in which they enter into long-term
contracts with specialty firms that in turn work only with a select group of
large farming companies that either directly operate, or oversee operations
of farms that use acceptable farming methods.
To do this, however, both the specialty wholesale firms and the
retailers must have ways of assuring that the farming and/or husbandry
methods used in fact meet the specifications of the retailer. The solution
has been the development of a large variety of standards for agribusiness
and food processing, sometimes in collaboration with industry trade
groups, environmentalists, organic food advocates, and/or NGOs.47 An
important example of a food safety certification program that was
developed through many iterations of private sector and government
action is the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
program used to identify, prevent, and control food safety hazards. This
program was first developed in the U.S. in the 1960s, but is now
recognized and used worldwide, with various Chinese government
agencies, for example, trying to implement and apply the standard for both
domestic and exported food products,48 and a new ISO food safety

47

Hatanaka Bain, & Busch, 2005, at 357, notes that both public and private standards
now exist for “food safety (e.g., Codex standards), food quality (private retailer or
processor standards), Good Agricultural Practices, Good Manufacturing Practices and/or
Good Management Practices (e.g., ISO 9000 standards), labor practices (e.g., SA 8000,
ETI Baseline, and Fairtrade standards), environmental standards (e.g., ISO 14000
standards, Rainforest Alliance ECO-OK standards), and/or non-genetically modified
materials.” See also Busch, 2000.

48

In April 2002, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China (AQSIQ) formally released the Regulation
on Sanitarian Registration of Firms for Export Foods, in which it requires firms that
export six kinds of foods (canned food, fish and fishery products, meat, frozen
vegetables, juices, fast food containing meat or fish) to implement HACCP. See AQSIQ
Order No. 20, April 19, 2002. In March 2002, the Certification and Accreditation
Administration of the People’s Republic of China (CNCA) promulgated regulation based
on HACCP Certification. See CNCA Public Notice No. 3, 2002, at
http://www.cnca.gov.cn/rjwzcfl/flfg/xzgf/644.shtml.
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management system, ISO 22000, incorporating HACCP and standardizing
it across countries.49
But while government imposed standards have long been
important in the food industry, the private sector is now taking the lead in
developing, implementing, and enforcing standards in most of the
developed world.50 The proliferation of private standards for use in
business-to-business transactions has extremely high transactions costs,
however, and is leading, in many areas, to efforts within industries to
consolidate and develop harmonized standards (Henson 2006).
Standards are of little use unless they can be implemented and
enforced, however, and this is where the role of third-party inspectors and
certifiers comes in -- to provide assurance to customers that the products
were in fact produced and prepared in the manner the retailer claims
(Hatanaka, Bain & Busch 2005).51 Hence both private and public
standards and third-party inspection, assurance and certification have
proliferated in recent years.52

C. APPAREL
Apparel production is highly labor-intensive and the technology
involved is relatively primitive. Thus apparel is an industry for which a
developing country with an abundance of low-skilled labor might have a
“comparative advantage” (Abernathy, et. al. 1999; Gereffi1999). In the
49

Stories concerning the safety of imported food products, especially food from China
were prominent in the news at the time of writing this article. See, e.g., Weisman, 2007;
Barionuevo, 2007; Zhang & King Jr., 2007; China’s Food Safety, Economist.com
Opinion, June 12, 2007.

50

Major food retailers in the UK, for example, have, since 1990 increasingly utilized
“private label products as a means to differentiate themselves from competitors and
achieve market power through the supply chain,” and have adopted “protocols for
suppliers that were enforced through second-party audits.” Henson, 2006.

51

Hatanaka, Bain & Busch, 2005, assert that “one of the primary reasons given for the
proliferation of TPC [“third party certification] is its perceived character as independent
and objective.”

52

The UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has estimated that as
many as 400 private standards may exist for agriculture and food processing. See WTO
G/SPS/GEN/746, Private Standards and the SPS Agreement, January, 2007.
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last few decades, nearly all U.S. apparel assembly factories have been
closed, and firms have moved production offshore in order to take
advantage of low wages in developing countries. The move to offshore
production has generally been accompanied by changes in the structure of
the apparel industry that link retail, apparel production, and textile sectors
tightly together in coordinated supply chains (Abernathy, et. al. 1999).
Rather than integrating vertically by combining these activities in
hierarchical firms, however, most of the large branded apparel firms (e.g.,
Liz Claiborne) have “outsourced” production to contractors in developing
countries, while major retailers have developed their own network of
contract suppliers for store-brand products. These new supply chain
arrangements typically utilize some combination of “captured” and
“relational” supply chain governance arrangements (Gereffi 1999;
Abernathy, et. al. 1999).
Initially, the transnational corporations that were the “lead firms”
in these supply chains, such as Nike, The Gap, and Wal-Mart, maintained
tight control of their overseas contractor firms to ensure that they could
supply sufficient quantities of the desired product, at a high enough level
of quality and low enough price, and in a timely manner.53 These
contractors, in turn, began to establish networks of subcontractors that
carried out much of the production for the lead firm’s market on demand,54
but the overall supply chain governance model could still be characterized
as “captive.” For some products, however, Nike and the others established
looser relations with garment manufacturers who all use standardized bar
codes, electronic data exchange platforms, labelling, and other methods of
coordination. Codification and standardization of information systems
enhances coordination between supplier and retailer, while also making it
possible for the manufacturers to work for a variety apparel firms and
retailers. Thus we see a shift in the apparel industry from tightly controlled
53

Gereffi, 1999, at 47, quotes Jerome Chazen, one of founders of Liz Claiborne, saying
that “ . . . we had to train and develop [overseas manufacturers] by supplying technical
help, trim, findings, and virtually all components. While we counted on them for their
labor, we had to tell them exactly how to use the basic skills of their people and we had to
watch them carefully, every step of the way.”).
54

Locke observes, for example, that “by guaranteeing a significant number of orders and
by placing Nike employees at these new factories to help monitor product quality and
production processes, Nike was able to help its lead vendors establish an extensive
network of footwear factories throughout Southeast Asia.”
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“captive” governance arrangements to looser, more flexible “relational”
governance arrangements (Gereffi 1999). And instead of putting their own
employees into contractors plants to make sure the job is done right, they
are relying more heavily on “vendor certification systems to improve
performance” (Gereffi 1999, at 47).
In the 1990s, consumers and labor activists around the world began
inquiring into labor conditions at factories making branded apparel and
footwear products. At Nike in particular, activists called attention to
problems of “underpaid workers in Indonesia, child labor in Cambodia and
Pakistan, and poor working conditions in China and Vietnam,” (Locke
2002, at 9), among other problems. At first, Nike tried to dismiss these
criticisms as not their problem because the factories were owned and
operated by other firms. Regardless of how much actual control Nike
exerted at the factory level, however, Nike found in the 1990s that it
would be held to account for working conditions not only in “captive”
manufacturing plants, but in all factories where its products were made
(Locke 2002).
Nike’s experience was shared by several other high visibility
branded apparel firms, including Kathy Lee Gifford and Liz Claiborne. As
a result of activism by labor and NGOs, a number of standards for labor
and environmental conditions in apparel and footwear factories have been
developed, and a small army of inspectors and certifiers have taken up the
task of attempting to enforce these standards in factories around the world.
At least half a dozen NGOs, as well as numerous apparel firms and
retailers, have now established labor standards for apparel manufacturing
facilities,55 and dozens of organizations conduct “audits” of apparel plants
around the world to promote compliance with these standards.

55

Prominent independent standard setters for apparel firms include Social Accountability
International, Fair Labor Association, Worker Rights Consortium, Worldwide
Responsible Apparel Production, Ethical Trading Initiative, and the Clean Clothes
Campaign. See discussion above in Part 3.4.1 In addition, the U.S. Dept. of Labor has
identified more than 35 U.S. manufacturers of apparel or retailers of apparel products that
have developed and subscribe to codes of conduct regarding their foreign operations. U.S.
Dept. of Labor, ILAB – II., Codes of Conduct in the U.S. Apparel Industry, available at
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/apparel/2b.htm, last visited June 28, 2006.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
The problem of organizing complex production has for the most part
been analyzed by law and economics scholars in a dichotomous way:
production can be accomplished either through a series of market
transactions, or under the guidance and control of a hierarchical
governance structure within a firm (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975). A rich
and well-developed literature has emerged in the last few decades
analyzing these two modes, as well as “hybrid” modes such as relational
contracts, and considering why one mode might be used in some
circumstances, and the other in different circumstances (Williamson 2005;
Williamson 1975; Klein, Crawford & Alchian 1978). And, as discussed
above, a more recent, but rapidly growing, literature has explored how
globalization is leading to more “outsourcing,” in which activities that
were once carried on within a single firm are now being organized by
contracts, across multiple firms, and often in multiple countries (Grossman
& Helpman 2005; Feenstra 1998).
Nearly all of the economic literature on choice of organizational
form, globalization, and the “outsourcing” phenomenon, however,
implicitly assumes the existence of an institutional context in which rule of
law is followed, minimum social standards and business norms are
established and regulated (or are at least commonly accepted and followed
within a given trade), and contracts can be enforced. We have seen,
however, that production through supply chains as described above is
moving into countries where rule of law is weak, property rights are
uncertain, and courts cannot be depended on to enforce contracts
efficiently. This suggests a puzzle. How are firms overcoming weak rule
of law to move production outside of the firm into countries with
underdeveloped legal regimes, since organizing production through
contracts, especially with hybrid bilateral, long-term relational contracts,
depends on clear property rights and efficient enforcement of contracts?
One mechanism is to import rule of law by, in essence, using
private ordering to “mitigate conflicts and realize mutual gains from trade”
(Williamson 2005: 14). Some mechanisms of private ordering, such as
arbitration agreements, may be effective as a backstop to enforce global
contracts between large, sophisticated parties. But the hazards of
contracting seem unrelieved by an agreement to arbitrate between a small,
foreign supplier and a large, branded buyer in such industries as apparel,
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food, flowers, commodities, electronics, and so forth, because an
arbitration finding must still, somehow, be enforced. Moreover, where
commercial regimes that depend on private ordering have been studied,
such as ranchers’ border disputes in Shasta County (Ellickson 1991) or
diamond merchants in New York (Berstein 1992), it has been concluded
that such private ordering requires voluntary communities coherent
enough to use the social sanctions of inclusion and exclusion effectively
(Richman 2004). These private ordering regimes thus pose high barriers to
entry (id. at page 2346), and seem unlikely to provide a general,
transnational solution.
In this paper we posit that increasing standardization of products
and processes, such as through ISO processes, in conjunction with thirdparty assurance and certification, provides an important institutional
solution to the puzzle otherwise posed by moving production out of firms
and into hybrids, networks, and global supply chains spanning “lawless”
environments. Standardization and certification reduce a number of the
costs of contracting that Coase identified with market transactions undertaking negotiations, writing contracts and settling disputes - and so
allow moving transactions out of firms. Standardization and certification
can also provide a workable substitute for management within firms in a
number of different kinds of productive arrangements, such as within
supply chains, in joint ventures and within regional industrial systems.
This approach may reduce the costs of communication about both
contracting and management, again, making it easier to move production
outside of firms. Beyond that, if regulation is understood to encompass
establishing standards of behavior and providing a mechanism for
evaluating compliance and enforcing those standards, standardization and
third-party assurance provide a workable substitute for government
regulation as well, permitting companies to enter long-term supply
relationships with some confidence, notwithstanding weak rule of law
environments. We will briefly elaborate upon these points.
In addressing the question of why some production is organized
within firms instead of across markets, given the powerful price incentives
that market transactions allow, Coase recognized various costs of market
transactions that can be reduced by organizing within firms (Coase 1937:
38). Included within these transaction costs were the cost of discovering
what prices are; and of negotiating contracts, addressing future
uncertainties and resolving disputes (Id., 38-41).
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A number of the transaction costs Coase identified are clearly
reduced by the use of broadly recognized standards for both products and
processes. The ISO standards now cover product specifications for
everything from nanotechnology to container ships, allowing suppliers to
develop and market products that will be competitive across markets, and
allowing buyers and suppliers to negotiate cheaply and with little
ambiguity about product characteristics. Contracts can be more easily
specified by reference to standards and certification processes to ensure
enforcement, leaving fewer aspects incomplete.
Certifiable standards and third-party assurance have reduced the
transaction costs of ensuring the quality of products produced outside the
firm. The concept of the “quality” of a product has become more complex
over the last decade, incorporating aspects of product differentiation,
health, safety, social and environmental implications of both products and
processes, trends that would otherwise seem to require more managerial
involvement and thus movement of production into vertically-integrated
firms (Ponte & Gibbon 2005, at page 3). Yet, ISO and other reliable
standards have been developed that permit standardization of these
otherwise complex phenomena, including the management systems to
address them, permitting clear communication to industrial buyers and
consumers through third-party assurance and certification to credible
quality standards. Thus, we have not seen a movement of production back
into vertically-integrated firms that we might otherwise expect as a
consequence of the managerial challenges inherent in the increased
complexity of the concept of product “quality”.
Standardization also has reduced the transaction costs of managing
the types of inter-firm relationships necessary to move supply chain
production away from “hierarchy” and toward “markets.” Nassimbeni
(1998) identifies the managerial challenge of the intermediate governance
arrangements seen in supply chains (“captive,” “relational,” and
“modular”), described above, as the need to strike the right balance
between not managing too tightly, in which case one loses the advantages
of inter-firm production (i.e., flexibility and involvement of independent
units), while still allowing enough coordination to render the activities of
the independent units coherent with the overall goals of the productive
project as a whole (Nassimbeni, 1998:545). Nassimbeni, relying upon
Mintzberg (1983), emphasizes the importance of standardization of
products, skills and processes as the main management technique
necessary to coordinate various inter-firm inputs effectively.
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Standardization also reduces the costs of communicating within
supply chains. In a study of value creation in supply chain relationships,
Cannon and Homburg (2001) summarized communications research
showing that face-to-face communication is better for customized
communication and for immediate feedback, but that it is more expensive
than written or electronic communication, which is best reserved for
communicating standardized information (Cannon & Homburg 2001).
Given the proliferation of standards, cheaper communications
technologies can be used to manage supply chain relationships, once
established, by referring to recognized standards in contractual documents
that largely follow standard formats, and by using third-party assurance to
determine if those standards have been met.
Third-party assurance to various standards has a particularly
important role to play in permitting private ordering regimes to extend
globally and beyond close-knit commercial communities. Empirical
evidence has demonstrated that certification is more likely to be sought the
greater the distance suppliers and buyers are from each other, the more
export-oriented the industry (Chapple et al. 2001); and the more difficult
the process or quality is to observe (Jiang & Bansal 2003). Park, Reddy &
Sakar (2000) summarize empirical data showing that many firms in the
United States have begun using supplier certification processes to formally
assess the management systems suppliers have in place, and that such
supplier certification systems facilitate the move away from “captive”
supply chain management structures to “relational” structures. These
studies suggest that certification can provide a mechanism to permit the
development of the trust that is necessary to sustain private ordering
arrangements, notwithstanding a lack of geographic and social proximity.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued in this paper that an important contributor to
globalization in recent years has been the rapid development of norms and
standards for business processes (as well as products), and of third-party
inspection and certification services that can provide assurance to
contracting parties that acceptable processes will be followed. Following
the model of financial accounting and auditing, which have been important
to business activity for centuries, the idea of standardization, assurance,
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and certification of process and activities by third parties has spread
rapidly from providing assurance that firms can meet quality standards, to
assurance that social and environmental norms are being met.
As global trade has expanded, and multinational firms have
extended their reach into all corners of the globe, the standardization of
business norms and practices has often been led by large, high-visibility
branded firms that are organizing these activities. These firms have pushed
to increase the share of inputs into complex products or services that are
produced or carried out in low labor-cost parts of the world. Global firms
have also wanted to increase their presence in and participation in the
expanding markets in these same parts of the world.
But while they have wanted to participate in developing economy
markets, global corporations have also wanted to avoid direct
responsibility for day-to-day operations at the shop floor level in those
countries. The result has been a greater reliance by lead firms in supply
chains on complex contracts to govern the relationships between the lead
firms and the contractors, rather than vertical integration, or extensive
direct control of the contractor by the lead firm. The standard explanation
for how this has been possible is that the technologies for transportation
and communications have improved. The efficiency of transportation and
communication has undoubtedly improved, but this may only explain the
spread of business production and trade to new parts of the world, not the
organization of this activity via contract rather than vertical integration.
Complex contracts are only a viable method of organizing supply chain
production if they can be adequately enforced. Because a great deal of
supply chain activity takes place in parts of the world where rule of law is
absent or weak, and courts are likely to be absent, corrupt, or incompetent,
businesses cannot necessarily rely on formal legal contract enforcement.
We suggest instead that the move toward “relational” contracting
rather than integration and direct control of contractors is a product of the
development of new business institutions. We have examined two related
institutions in particular – the development by business interests, NGOs,
and other international organizations of clear standards for evaluating
business processes, from quality management to observance of human
rights to environmental responsibility, and the simultaneous emergence of
assurance services that can inspect, evaluate, assure, and certify that
contractors are satisfying the required norms.
Although these business institutions emerged initially to help solve
purely commercial problems, they have been enlisted by activists
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concerned about environmental and other social performance as a
mechanism for putting pressure on global corporations to internalize the
full social costs of their activities. In this way, these institutions may also
serve the function of regulating global business activity, in a way that
formal regulation at the state level, or formal international law, has so far
not been able to accomplish.
The development of widely-applicable social and environmental
norms for business processes and behavior, and private enforcement by
third-party inspection and supervision, is by no means a mature or
efficient institution. In the current environment, corporate codes of
conduct and social responsibility standards have proliferated, resulting in
much duplication in some sectors, with factory-owners complaining that
they may have to have 40 or 50 inspections per year to satisfy 20 or 30
different customers, each with their own standards (Rafter 2005).
Moreover, many of the standards are vague, and clear unambiguous
performance indicators have not yet been created for satisfying those
standards, unlike the ISO standards for products and management
processes such as IS0 9000 or ISO 14001. The assurance industry also
lacks its own professional standards and norms, and is often viewed as
corrupt or corruptible by business people who are pressured to meet the
standards. These are significant problems, to be sure.
But we believe that these problems will be resolved with time, and
that third-party assurance will mature. Moreover, because it has emerged
largely as a market-based solution, based on private ordering, third-party
assurance may be an enduring feature of the global business environment.
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